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COMMENTS

ABRIDGMENTS OF FREE SPEECH
WHICH DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS
OF VIEWPOINT: FINZER v. BARRY
Among the various purposes and functions served by the first
amendment's protection of free speech,' perhaps the most vital is
to insure that the marketplace of ideas, particularly in the political
arena, remains free. 2 When ideas compete freely in the market,

See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD

(1966); A.

A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

27 (1960) (American political process requires
equality of status in the field of ideas); R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.6, at 15 (1986) (truth emerges only in
the "marketplace" of competing ideas). Emerson succinctly summarizes four principle functions of the first amendment: a method of attaining individual self-fulfillment, a means of
discovering truth, a method of assuring that people participate in social and political decisions, and a means of keeping stability and change in proper balance in society. T. EMERSON,
supra, at 1.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . ." Id.
The free exchange of political ideas is especially important for two reasons. First, the
voicing of political opinions operates "as a catharsis throughout the body politic" by allowing a "release of energy, a lessening of frustration and a channelling of resistance into
courses consistent with law and order." T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 12; see also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (suppression of expression
leads to hate which menaces stable government), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 449 (1969) (overruled Whitney on ground that punishment of mere advocacy of violence violates first amendment).
Secondly, freedom of political expression enables the people to check abuses of power
by public officials. See Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 524 (freedom of expression is the power to unleash latent social forces, to
discredit persons and motivations, and to disrupt routines). Interestingly, Judge Bork, the
author of the majority opinion in Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the subject
of this Comment, has argued that the only speech entitled to full first amendment protection is political speech, which he has defined as including "a wide range of evaluation, criticism, electioneering, and propaganda." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971). However, while the Supreme Court does givq
special preference to debate on public issues, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
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place the public can discover an idea's truth or falsity and thereby
effect changes in society.' First amendment doctrine has been developed with an eye toward this purpose, and the Supreme Court
has exhibited an intolerance for restrictions of speech which hinder
the free exchange of ideas. 4 Thus, restrictions which exclude a particular speaker from a forum because of the content of his speech
have been disfavored by the Court.' Regulations of speech which
silence a speaker because he advocates one point of view on an
issue, while allowing a speaker with a different viewpoint to be
heard, are in even clearer conflict with first amendment values.6
270 (1964), it has never suggested that philosophical, social, artistic, economic or literary
expression is not entitled to the full protection of the first amendment. Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
" See T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 12-14; A. MEIKLFJOHN, supra note 1, at 24-27; J.S.
MILL, ON LIBERTY Ch. II (D. Spitz ed. 1975). Emerson points out that restraining free expression "conceals the real problems confronting a society and diverts public attention from
the critical issues," thus preventing necessary change from occurring in a peaceful way and
forcing it on the community in a "more violent and radical form .... Change is inevitable;
the only question is the rate and the method. The theory of freedom of expression offers
greater possibilities for rational, orderly adjustment than a system of suppression." T.
EMERSON, supra note 1, at 12-14.
Discovering the truth of an idea has long been recognized as a value of free expression.
John Milton believed the truth of an idea would be more potent and convincing after truth
and falsehood grappled with each other in "free and open encounter." J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA,

A SPEECH

FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENG-

(1644). John Stuart Mill argued that the truth or falsity of an opinion could only be
discovered if it is heard. J. S. MILL, supra, Ch. II; see also T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 7-8
(freedom of expression is the "best process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth"). The ideas of Milton and Mill form the basis of the "marketplace of ideas" doctrine
that was articulated by Justice Holmes. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (best test of truth is the power of the thought to get accepted in the market).
4 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (government must preserve marketplace of ideas); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open").
5 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (university cannot enforce a
content-based exclusion of religious speech); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (statute that prohibited all picketing except in labor disputes is inconsistent with equal protection clause); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of...
its subject matter, or its content"); see also Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978).
Stone defines content-based restrictions as prohibitions on "communication because of the
message conveyed" and notes that the Supreme Court has been especially wary of such
restrictions. Id. at 81-82.
6 See City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976). "To permit one side of a debatable public question to
have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional
guarantees." Id. (footnote omitted).

LAND
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The Supreme Court has tolerated content-based discrimination
only upon a showing of the proper level of justification by the regulating body.7 Yet the Court has never explicitly held that a re-

striction on speech that discriminates against one point of view is
capable of passing constitutional muster.8 Recently, however, in
Finzer v. Barry,9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld a statute that permits the display of signs within
five hundred feet of a foreign embassy when the signs are supportive of the embassy's government, but bans signs, within the same
area, which are critical of that government. 10 The court concluded
that viewpoint-based restrictions warrant no greater level of scrutiny than content-based restrictions.11
The appellants in Finzer wanted to demonstrate in front of
the Soviet and Nicaraguan Embassies in Washington, D.C. by carrying placards critical of those governments' policies.12 Without a
permit, issued at the discretion of the D.C. Chief of Police, such
demonstrations are barred by section 22-1115 of the District of Columbia Code. 3 Arguing that it was contrary to the first and four7See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (validating exclusion of rival teacher group from interschool mail system), remanded sub nom.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 705 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1983); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 147-48 (1978) (upheld administrative action that punished radio broadcast of
sexually explicit speech); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upheld prohibition against political advertisements on publicly owned bus line). But cf. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (broad generalization that speech can never be regulated on the basis of
content or subject matter).
8 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[The Supreme
Court has] never held that government may allow discussion of a subject and then discriminate among viewpoints on that particular topic, even if the government for certain reasons
may entirely exclude discussion of the subject from the forum." Id.; see also infra notes 3849 and accompanying text (discussion of viewpoint discrimination).
9 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 55 U.S.L.W.
3569 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987) (No. 86-803).
,0Id. at 1452-53.
Id. at 1469.
"Id. at 1453. Plaintiff Father R. David Finzer claimed to have been prevented by D.C.
police from demonstrating in the past and wished to carry signs critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of official buildings of those governments. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9. Plaintiff Bridget Brooker allegedly had been prevented from participating in two
political demonstrations on the public streets and sidewalks within 500 feet of official foreign buildings. Id. at 10. Plaintiff J. Michael Waller wished to carry a sign in front of the
Nicaraguan Embassy which contained the words "Stop the Killing." Finzer, 798 F.2d at
1453. Plaintiff Michael Boos wished to demonstrate on the sidewalk in front of the Soviet
Embassy carrying a sign with the word "Solidarity." Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10.
, The full text of section 22-1115 reads:
It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or
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teenth amendments, the appellants moved for summary judgment
in the district court, seeking a permanent injunction against the
statute's enforcement and a declaration of its unconstitutionality.1 4
The district court upheld the constitutionality of section 221115 and granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment.15 The court relied upon Frend v. United States,", decided
one half century earlier by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
which concluded that the statute did not violate the first
amendment.
On appeal, a divided D.C. circuit panel affirmed the district
court ruling. 18 Writing for the court, Judge Bork noted that because Frend had been decided nearly fifty years ago, it had to be
adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium any foreign government,
party, or organization, or any officer or officers thereof, or to bring into public
disrepute political, social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign
government, party, or organization, or to intimidate, coerce, harass, or bring into
public disrepute any officer or officers or diplomatic or consular representatives
of any foreign government, or to interfere with the free and safe pursuit of the
duties of any diplomatic or consular representatives of any foreign government,
within 500 feet of any building or premises within the District of Columbia used
or occupied by any foreign government or its representative or representatives as
an embassy, legation, consulate, or for other official purposes, except by, and in
accordance with, a permit issued by the Chief of Police of the said District; or to
congregate within 500 feet of any such building or premises, and refuse to disperse
after having been ordered so to do by the police authorities of the said District.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981) (emphasis added).
Generally, a statute which gives the governing body complete discretion in issuing permits for exercising freedom of expression is considered unconstitutional. See Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) (licensing scheme without objective standard is unconstitutional). However, section 22-1115 had previously been interpreted as making the issuance of a permit subject to the prohibitions of the statute and not the discretion
of the Chief of Police. Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939). Therefore, the plaintiffs had no purpose in challenging the
permit provision, since the Chief of Police cannot issue permits to those who require them
by statute. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1497 n.25 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
14Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1453.
:5

Id. at 1453-54.

100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939).
at 693. See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1454.
Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1477. The court also remanded the case to the district court to
make factual and legal findings with respect to the allegations in the complaint of incidents
in which police officers, who claimed to be enforcing section 22-1115, prevented some of the
appellants from engaging in activity which the statute does not proscribe. Id. Father Finzer,
for example, claimed to have been prevented by the police from kneeling on the sidewalk in
front of the Soviet Embassy to pray silently for the dead. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at
9. The statute had been interpreted previously to exclude from its purview demonstrations
in which no signs are carried. See Zaimi v. United States, 476 F.2d 511, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18

1? Id.
28
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reexamined in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent.1 9 The
court equated content-discriminatory and viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions and subjected section 22-1115 to a strict scrutiny
analysis, questioning whether it was necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.2 0 Judge Bork examined the purpose
and history of the statute and concluded that the federal government had a compelling interest in the peace and dignity of foreign
embassies and in the security of the representatives and property
of foreign governments.2 1 Further, the court found the statute necessary to achieve those interests and to meet the United States'
obligations to foreign missions imposed by international law.2 2
Chief Judge Wald dissented, arguing that the asserted governmental interests were not compelling and that at best, they would
justify a content-neutral restriction. 23 Additionally, the dissent
criticized the majority's analysis of the law applicable to viewpoint-based restrictions, 24 and concluded that, because a less restrictive alternative was available, namely a viewpoint-neutral restriction, the viewpoint-discriminatory nature of section 22-1115
rendered it unconstitutional.2 5
In Finzer v. Barry, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals validated a viewpoint-discriminatory statute by subjecting it to the
same level of scrutiny applicable to statutes which discriminate on
the basis of content, but which are viewpoint-neutral. 26 It is submitted that the court erred in finding that viewpoint-based and
content-based statutes should receive the same type of scrutiny.
Furthermore, the court failed to correctly appraise the underinclu" Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1454.
20Id. at 1468. The level of scrutiny applied by the court may have been somewhat less
than strict. Judge Bork, speaking for the majority, thought that Finzer presented "an un-

usually strong case for judicial deference" which "necessarily shapes the nature of the scrutiny to which we subject the justifications offered ..." Id. at 1459. The dissent believed that
the majority's "superdeference" approach discounted the required level of scrutiny. Id. at

1482-84 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
2

Id. at 1465.

Id. at 1470-75. The majority rejected the appellants' arguments that the means established by the statute were unconstitutionally vague, standardless, facially overbroad, and
discriminatory. Id.
22 Id. at 1484-87 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
2,Id. at 1493-96 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
22 Id. The dissent also maintained that section 22-1115 was both underinclusive and
22

overinclusive. Id. at 1487-91 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 1469. The majority, while implicitly recognizing that section 22-1115 discriminates against certain viewpoints, argued that the statute really was not viewpoint-discriminatory. Id. at 1475. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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siveness and overinclusiveness of the statute, and wrongly discerned a viable viewpoint-neutral alternative to be the most restrictive means, simply because it would ban both viewpoints and
in an absolute sense prohibit more speech. This Comment will
examine viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions in light of first
amendment case law and will suggest that the Finzer court's analysis of such restrictions is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and with the underlying purposes of the first amendment.
SECTION

22-1115

IS VIEWPOINT-DISCRIMINATORY

Writing for the majority, Judge Bork argued that section 221115 is viewpoint-neutral: "[T]here is no single point of view
targeted at all; . . .what is prohibited in front of the East German

Embassy is permitted in front of the West German one, and vice
versa."28 This argument is defective in that it enlarges the forum
to the entire city of Washington, D.C. According to Judge Bork's
reasoning, people wishing to display signs critical of a foreign gov-

ernment can do so anywhere in Washington, but simply cannot
display them within five hundred feet of that government's embassy.29 The true forum to be examined, however, is precisely that

five hundred foot radius surrounding each embassy. If two groups
of demonstrators representing opposing viewpoints marched peace27

See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1466; infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.

28 Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1475. See also Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America

at 19 (same hypothetical). Actually, Judge Bork's statement would be inaccurate in certain
circumstances. For example, if survivors of Nazi concentration camps wanted to mark the
anniversary of their release by displaying signs denouncing the Holocaust, they presumably
would be prohibited from so doing in front of the East or West German Embassy since
those signs arguably bring both governments "into public odium." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 221115 (1981). The point is that political issues "do not divide themselves neatly along national lines like paired legislative votes." Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1494 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
29 See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1475. This forum-enlarging device would work well to validate virtually any statute which discriminated on the basis of the viewpoint or content of
speech. By enlarging the forum to the whole nation, for example, a New York statute
prohibiting all religious speech in public parks or streets would be constitutional because
the same speech is allowed in New Jersey. Likewise, New York City could pass an ordinance
barring Jehovahi's Witnesses from speaking in Manhattan simply because they were free to
speak in the other boroughs. Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (denying
Jehovah's Witnesses access to public park unconstitutional where other religious groups had
access).
With respect to the argument that a speaker affected by section 22-1115 can express
himself elsewhere, the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative
means of expression." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541
n.10 (1980).
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fully toward the embassy of a foreign government, only those who
displayed signs critical of that government would be excluded from
the streets and sidewalks within five hundred feet of the embassy.30 Whatever the asserted governmental interests for making
such a distinction,3 1 it clearly discriminates in favor of those with
one viewpoint and against those with a different one. Section 221115 closes a forum, capable of amplifying the impact of the speakers' message, to one group of speakers because of their viewpoint. 2
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REGARDING VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION

While the Supreme Court has generally held content-discriminatory statutes unconstitutional," it has nonetheless upheld laws
34
which clearly regulate speech on the basis of its content. Most
commentators agree that certain content-based distinctions are not
only acceptable, but inescapable.35 Content distinctions, for example, are necessary to define which speech is protected by the first
amendment, and which is not.36 As one commentator has noted,
SO See

Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1494-95 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
31See id. at 1454-63. The court relied primarily on two governmental interests in upholding section 22-1115. The majority found that the interest in protecting the dignity of
foreign embassies and the interest in maintaining the security of foreign diplomats here and
American diplomats abroad were together sufficiently compelling to justify the statute. Id.
However, it is submitted that the statute is underinclusive because both of those interests
may be threatened by pro-government demonstrations as well. If the interests which the
government is trying to advance are truly compelling, they would be better served by a
statute which banned all political demonstrations. See id. at 1490-91 (Wald, C.J., dissenting); infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
" See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1494 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (the statute bars those who
disagree with a government's policy but welcomes those who agree).
-" See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
(discusses Constitution's hostility to regulation of content of speech such as "prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic").
U4See supra note 7; see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (exclusion of
speakers from military base on basis of political content of speech valid).
" See Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113, 116-18 (1981) (discussing distinctions made to restrict obscenity and other speech
which enjoys no first amendment protection); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination,68 V& L. REV. 203, 206-14 (1982) (broad content neutrality rule is inconsistent with any rational analysis of freedom of expression); Stone, supra note 5, at 100-15
(suggesting that viewpoint-neutral restrictions of subject-matter should be subject to a different level of scrutiny than other content-based restrictions).
" See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (examination of content necessary to
determine if subject matter is obscene and therefore not protected). These types of distinctions regarding the content of speech do not necessarily contravene the values or purposes
of the freedom of speech. Cf. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 24-27 (explaining that certain
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"one could not devise a rational system of freedom of expression
without differentiating among kinds of speech according to
37
'
content.

In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Perry Education Association
v. Perry Local Educators' Association,"' set forth the standards of
justification necessary to uphold a statute which discriminates
against certain speech on the basis of content.39 Applying the
Perry analysis in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,40 the Court upheld an Executive Order that limited participation in a federal employee charity drive."' While this
decision did not revolve primarily around the issue of viewpoint
discrimination, the majority stated that viewpoint-discriminatory
restrictions on speech are unacceptable even in a nonpublic forum,
where freedom of speech receives the least protection under the
first amendment.42 Moreover, four different United States Courts
speech must be abridged to insure "that everything worth saying shall be said"); infra notes
44-49 and accompanying text.
17 Stephan, supra note 35, at 211. For example, according to Professor Meiklejohn's
theory, the first amendment's protection of speech springs from the necessities of the American system of self-government and as such protects public debate so that voters may consider both sides of an issue. A. MEIKELJOHN, supra note 1, at 26-27. Under such a theory,
only speech "which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal"
is entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at 79. This is a content distinction.
38 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
3 Id. at 45-46. The Perry Court established three categories of forums. First, public
forums, such as streets and parks are those "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate ... "Id. at 45. In this type of forum
the government's power to regulate speech is at a minimum and content-based distinctions
must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and... narrowly drawn to achieve
that end." Id. Second, a designated or limited public forum "consists of public property
which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Id.
There, the same strict scrutiny test applies. Id. at 46. The third type of forum is a nonpublic
forum the government may regulate on the basis of content "as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ... the speaker's view." Id.
-0 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
41 See id. at 3446-55.
42 Id. at 3451. Of seven Justices participating in this case, six explicitly said that viewpoint discrimination is intolerable. The dissent said that exclusion of particular speakers
from a nonpublic forum "must be viewpoint-neutral, just as if the property were a traditional or limited public forum." Id. at 3458 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority enunciated its position on viewpoint neutrality several times and remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine if the government had excluded the respondents because of a desire to suppress their viewpoint. Id. at 3451, 3454-55. For a more recent statement by the
Supreme Court evincing an intolerance for viewpoint discrimination, see Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 914 (1986) (holding that regulation of speech
which discriminates on the basis of viewpoint is not narrowly tailored means of furthering
compelling state interest and violates first amendment).
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of Appeals have recently interpreted the Cornelius decision, and
each has concluded that content-based distinctions in nonpublic
forums are tolerable only if viewpoint-neutral. 43 Scholarly commentators are virtually unanimous, as well, in finding that viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional. 44 The Supreme Court's
In Perry, the Supreme Court explained that the government's power to regulate speech
is at a minimum in public forums and at the same time implied that freedom of speech
receives the least protection in nonpublic forums. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; San Diego
Comm. Against Registration & the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union
High School Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1480 (9th Cir. 1986) (speech in a nonpublic forum receives
the least protection under the first amendment).
41 M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1471-76
(11th Cir. 1986) (newspaper on military base); San Diego Comm. Against Registration &
Draft, 790 F.2d 1471, 1478-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding advertisement from school newspaper); May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1986)
(meetings on school property); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist.
Bd. of School Directors, 776 F.2d 431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985) (prohibiting antinuclear demonstration on school grounds), remanded, 633 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
The Ninth Circuit held that a school board's refusal to publish an advertisement in
school newspapers that provided information regarding alternatives to military service is
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination. San Diego Comm. Against Registration &
the Draft, 790 F.2d at 1478-81. The court said that even if the newspaper is a nonpublic
forum, by allowing the publication of military recruitment advertisements, the School Board
allowed the presentation of one side of a highly controversial issue. Id. at 1481. Refusing
access to the newspaper to those who opposed military service was viewpoint discrimination.
Id. Analogously, by allowing those with signs supportive of a foreign government to enter
the streets surrounding that government's embassy, the District of Columbia discriminates
against selected viewpoints when it refuses access to those whose signs are critical of the
foreign government. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
The Seventh Circuit also followed Cornelius and found that while viewpoint discrimination is not permissible even in a nonpublic forum, permitting meetings on school property
on any subject except religion is not viewpoint-discriminatory. May, 787 F.2d at 1114-15.
The Third Circuit held that, while viewpoint discrimination "is impermissible regardless of the nature of the forum," a school board's policy of keeping political activities off
school grounds was not viewpoint-discriminatory. Student Coalition For Peace, 776 F.2d at
437. The school board had prohibited usage of school facilities for a public antinuclear and
peace exposition, but the board had a general policy of keeping the "podium of politics off
school grounds" and was not attempting to exclude only those who were against nuclear
weapons. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit also followed the Supreme Court's holding in Cornelius and found
that the Army's decision awarding a contract to a newspaper for exclusive distribution on
certain military bases did not infringe another newspaper's constitutional rights because it
was viewpoint-neutral. M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc., 791 F.2d at 1471-76.
41 See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 27 (speakers should not be barred "because their views are thought to be false or dangerous"); L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at 672 n.1 (1978) (viewpoint discrimination is "tantamount to forbidden censorship"); Stephan, supra note 35, at 215-18, 233-36 (issue "is not the validity of a
viewpoint neutrality rule, but rather its exclusivity"); Stone, supra note 5, at 103-04 (government restriction of speech because idea false, wrong, or bad "directly contravenes basic
first amendment principles"). John Stuart Mill made an eloquent statement against silenc-
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insistence upon viewpoint neutrality derives from its perception of
the purposes of free speech.45 The Court has especially sought to
protect the free exchange of ideas in the political arena.4" "To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in
expressing its views to the government," the Court has said, "is the
antithesis of constitutional guarantees."4 7 If it is necessary within a
particular forum to exclude from the "marketplace of ideas" an entire subject or topic, those ideas can compete in other forums and
neither will gain an undue advantage over the other. However, if
only one viewpoint is eliminated from the marketplace, while the
opposite viewpoint is allowed to "monopolize" the forum, the first
amendment's purposes are seriously undermined. 4 As the Seventh
Circuit said, "even in a nonpublic forum, the government's interest
in interfering with the free market in ideas through discriminatory
restrictions on particular points of view . . . is slight, and the po'49
tential injury to this important market significant.
ing one point of view: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person
were to the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one
person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." J.S. MLL,
supra note 3, at 18.
Judge Bork, in expounding his theory of the first amendment, said that principles of a
system of free speech must "be neutral in all three meanings of the word: they must be
neutrally derived, defined, and applied." Bork, supra note 2, at 23. Yet, it would seem that
discrimination against one viewpoint can result only where the principles of free speech are
defined or applied in a way which is not neutral.
' See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
' Id. It is submitted that carrying signs in front of a foreign embassy is political speech
deserving utmost first amendment protection for several reasons. First, political issues, such
as human rights, often cut across international lines. See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1494 (Wald,
C.J., dissenting). Second, it is apparent that demonstrators in front of a foreign embassy,
aside from any desire to influence that country's policies, are also making a political "statement" to public officials of the United States in an effort to influence our foreign policy.
Thus, the majority's assertion that foreign officials have no obligation to be accessible to
public attack misses the point because the messages which demonstrators seek to convey are
not directed solely at those inside a particular embassy. See id. at 1462; see also Edwards v.
California, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (public-issue picketing is an exercise of basic constitutional rights in pristine and classic form).
" City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
" See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 197-200 (1983). Stone points out that laws
which discriminate against certain ideas or viewpoints are "incompatible with the central
precepts of the first amendment," not because such a law restricts a large volume of speech,
but because it effectively excises "a specific message from public debate, [and thus] mutilates 'the thinking process of the community.'" Id. at 198 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 1, at 27).
"' May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Finzer COURT'S

INTERPRETATION

In response to the appellants' argument that viewpoint-discriminatory statutes like section 22-1115 are per se unconstitutional, the Finzer court said it did "not think the law is more severe with respect to viewpoint-based restrictions than it is to
content-based restrictions." 50 To support its contention that "the
Supreme Court has maintained a uniform standard" with respect
to content-based restrictions which are viewpoint-neutral and
those that are not, 51 the majority in Finzer cited a footnote in Carey v. Brown.52 First, the court should have relied on the more recent Supreme Court decisions which clearly enunciate an intolerance for viewpoint discrimination rather than an extraneous
footnote in an earlier case.5 3 Second, this footnote does not support
the Finzer court's proposition. It merely explains that a law which
does not discriminate against viewpoint is still hostile to the first
amendment if it discriminates on the basis of the subject matter of
the speaker's message.5 4 The Carey Court in no way implied that a
viewpoint-discriminatory law is no more hostile to the first amendment than a viewpoint-neutral law which discriminates on the basis of content. 55
50

Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1469.

51 Id.
52

447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1979).

"
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 106 S. Ct. at 914 (order requiring utility to place
newsletter of third party in its billing envelopes "impermissibly burdens appellants First
Amendment rights . . . because it selects the other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3451
(1985) ("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum and are viewpoint-neutral"); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (in a
nonpublic forum, regulation of speech must be reasonable and "not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view").
G See Carey, 447 U.S. at 462 n.6. The footnote reads:
It is, of course, no answer to assert that the Illinois statute does not discriminate
on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint, but only on the basis of the subject matter
of his message. "The First Amendments hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic."
Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
"' See id. Carey involved an Illinois statute which generally prohibited picketing of
residences or dwellings, but exempted from its prohibition peaceful picketing of a place of
employment involved in a labor dispute. Carey, 447 U.S. at 457. The Court explicitly
pointed out that the statute discriminated on the basis of content. Id. at 460. However,
since the statute was viewpoint-neutral, the Court had no reason to equate viewpoint-neutral restrictions which are content-based with viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions. In fact,
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The Finzer court next relied on Parkerv. Levy 56 in attempting
to rebut the appellants' contention that viewpoint-discriminatory
statutes are per se invalid.57 However, in Parker the Supreme
Court never addressed the question of whether the statute in issue
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.5 8 Furthermore, in holding
that the regulation of speech in Parker was constitutional, the
Court relied very heavily on the military context in which the case
occurred.5
Thus, it is submitted, the Finzer court was not warranted in
relying on the Carey and Parker decisions as support for its proposition that viewpoint-discriminatory statutes are not only permissible, but are subject merely to the same level of scrutiny as
content-based, viewpoint-neutral restrictions. Clearly, a statute
which discriminates against those who hold views which are critical
of a foreign government abridges the freedom of speech in a way
which poses graver constitutional concerns than a viewpoint-neutral regulation.6 0 Therefore, in accordance with recent Supreme
Court decisions which require viewpoint-neutrality even in nonthe Court did no such thing anywhere in. its opinion. See id. at 455. Moreover, the regulation of speech involved in the ConsolidatedEdison Co. case, which the Supreme Court cited
in Carey, was also viewpoint-neutral. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530 (1980).
" 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1469 & n.14.
See Parker,417 U.S. 733.
See id. at 743-52, 758-59. The Court pointed out that "[jiust as military society has
been a society apart from civilian society, so '[m]ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which
exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.'" Id. at 744 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion)).
In fact, Judge Bork, in writing for the majority, acknowledged the Parker Court's heavy
reliance on the military context. See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1469 n.14.
60 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. A content-based staute which is viewpoint-neutral will close down a forum to all discussion of a particular subject, leaving the
differing ideas to compete elsewhere. However, when only certain points of view are excluded from the forum, the debate becomes distorted. Professor Meiklejohn pointed out the
problem with barring speakers because of their points of view: "It is that mutilation of the
thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution
is directed." A.'MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 27.
Content-based restrictions are problematic, but they do not prevent one side of the
debate from being heard. Professor Stephan has argued that, while content-based restrictions must be tolerated to some degree, any system that protects speech must insist on
viewpoint neutrality. Stephan, supra note 35, at 233. He points out that a rule of viewpoint
neutrality "rests on the realization that speech of constitutional significance suffers indirectly from advantages given to opposing points of view, and that this indirect harm
amounts to suppression." Id. In the instant case, section 22-1115 encourages points of view
which support foreign governments and effectively suppresses speech in opposition to them.
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public forums,6 1 the Finzer court should have held section 22-1115
to be per se unconstitutional because it discriminates on the basis
of viewpoint.
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES

Even if the majority was correct in concluding that viewpointdiscriminatory statutes are not per se unconstitutional, it failed to
recognize that only a viewpoint-neutral alternative to section 221115 can adequately and constitutionally serve the asserted compelling governmental interests. 2 Judge Bork concluded that the
government had compelling interests in protecting the dignity of
foreign missions and maintaining the security of foreign governments' personnel and property.13 Whether or not these interests
are truly "compelling," the Finzer court's decision is erroneous because only a viewpoint-neutral regulation of speech in the vicinity
of foreign embassies would be constitutionally valid.
If the court was correct in finding that the governmental interests are compelling, then section 22-1115 is fatally underinclusive 6
"

See supra note 53.

62 See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.

"s See Finzer,798 F.2d at 1455-63. Judge Bork examined the obligations of the law of
nations and noted that embassies were to be protected by the host state from insult, intimidation, and threats of violence. See id. at 1455-58. However, in dissent, Chief Judge Wald
pointed out that the United States has often cited constitutional limitations on its ability to
curtail freedom of expression in response to complaints by foreign embassies of insult or
annoyance by American citizens. Id. at 1481-82 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). The majority also
cited Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which sets out the
duties expected of a host state in regard to mission premises, and observed that it imposes a
duty to protect embassies from damage, disturbance of peace, and impairment of its dignity.
See id. at 1457-58. The dissent maintained that Article 22 is flexible, requiring only that the
steps taken by host nations be "appropriate." Id. at 1482 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). Judge
Bork believed that the facts presented "an unusually strong case for judicial deference"
which "necessarily shapes the nature of the scrutiny to which we subject the justifications
offered for section 22-1115." Id. at 1459. Chief Judge Wald, however, argued that in sensitive first amendment areas, resort to Law of Nations cannot shortcut the process of constitutional adjudication that requires careful scutiny of the justification offered. Id. at 1483
(Wald, C.J., dissenting).
Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 218 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Erznoznik, the Supreme Court invalidated a public nuisance ordinance which
made it a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity
when the screen is visible from a public street. Id. at 210-12. The city of Jacksonville defended the statute, contending it had an interest in keeping automobile drivers from being
distracted by the pictures on the movie screen. Id. at 214. Noting that the statute singled
out movies containing nudity, the Court found that the statute was "strikingly underinclusive" and hence unconstitutional because movies with all sorts of scenes could just as easily
be distracting to the passing motorist. Id. at 214-15.
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because, as the D.C. Circuit has held, section 22-1115 prohibits
only demonstrations in which signs are displayed which bring the
embassy's government into public disrepute. e5 Since demonstrators
may lawfully shout hostilities and degrading insults, and otherwise
conduct themselves in a manner threatening or offensive to the
embassy's government, the interest in protecting the dignity of the
embassy is inadequately served. 6 Section 22-1115 also fails to
serve sufficiently the government's security interest because any
demonstration that involves a highly emotional or controversial issue, regardless of the demonstrators' viewpoint, is capable of becoming violent or illiciting a violent reaction from others, hence
threatening the security of the embassy.6 7 The kind of underinclusiveness from which section 22-1115 suffers, as the Supreme Court
has noted, "undermines the likelihood of a genuine [governmental]
interest." ' Moreover, it indicates that the statute is not drawn
narrowly enough. In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that
a regulation of speech is not a narrowly tailored means of furthering the asserted interests when it burdens the expression of certain
points of view. 70 Thus, the requirement of Perry that content-

based restrictions be narrowly tailored is not met by section 22eb See Zaimi v. United States, 476 F.2d 511, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Zaimi, the defendant had been convicted of bringing an officer of a foreign government into public disrepute.
Id. at 513-14. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 22-1115 operates only when there is a display of a flag, banner, placard, or device designed to bring a
foreign government into public odium or disrepute. Id. at 527. Therefore, the conviction of
the defendant was reversed because he merely shouted epithets critical of Iran. Id.
:6 See id. at 525-27.
7 See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1491 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wald argued that
the record contained no basis for the majority's conclusion that non-critical demonstrations
do not threaten the interests of avoiding violence and maintaining the dignity of the embassy. Id. The dissent also pointed out that the government's own affidavits, relied upon
heavily by the majority, did not suggest that demonstrations which included signs of one
particular viewpoint were more prone to outbreaks of violence. Id.
68 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978). The Supreme Court
held in Bellotti that even if the asserted interest underlying the statute in question was
compelling, the regulation of speech was still unconstitutional because it was overinclusive
and underinclusive. Id. at 792-95. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
396-99 (1984) (underinclusiveness of statute makes it "doubtful" that it can fairly be said to
advance any genuinely substantial governmental interest).
61 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (underinclusive
statute held unconstitutional because, when first amendment freedoms are implicated,
Court has "repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity of purpose are
essential").
71 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 914 (1986).
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1115.71 Furthermore, the strength of the asserted governmental in-

terests is debatable because the statute excludes from its coverage
speech which threatens those interests.7 2 To overcome these constitutional infirmities the statute should ban all demonstrations, or
signs are displayed
perhaps all political ones, regardless of whether
73
and regardless of the speakers' viewpoint.
If the governmental interests are not sufficiently compelling to
justify a content-based restriction, then, under Perry, only a content-neutral time, manner, or place restriction is constitutionally
permissible.74 Because section 22-1115 is viewpoint-discriminatory,
7'

See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).

72

See supra note 68.

71 Cf. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1495-96 (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that a prohibition

of all sign-holding would provide greater protection of security and dignity interests). Depending on which categories of speech are deemed threatening to the security or dignity of a
foreign embassy, a statute may need to protect only political speech or it may have to proscribe all demonstrations, regardless of content.
In response to Chief Judge Wald's suggestion that all demonstrations be barred, Judge
Bork characterized this viewpoint-neutral alternative as the most restrictive means to effectuate the governmental interests. Id. at 1465. The majority stated that restricting all expression is not a less restrictive alternative because more speech would be barred than presently
under section 22-1115. Id. The majority confused the least restrictive means test by suggesting that a viewpoint-neutral alternative is more restrictive of the freedom of speech than
a viewpoint-discriminatory statute. Id. at 1465-67. As the dissent pointed out, because a
viewpoint-discriminatory statute does more to undermine first amendment purposes than a
viewpoint-neutral law, banning all viewpoints would be less restrictive of free speech. Id. at
1491-93 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). See also Stone, supra note 48, at 198. Stone points out that
"the first amendment is concerned, not only with the extent to which a law reduces the total
quantity of communication, but also - and perhaps even more fundamentally - with the
extent to which the law distorts public debate." Id.
That Judge Bork's analysis is flawed is also apparent from an exchange between him
and Chief Judge Wald regarding a hypothetical about banning certain speech in a theatre.
Judge Bork suggested that "a locality that wished to prohibit the shouting of 'Fire!' in a
crowded theatre" would not "be constitutionally required to outlaw the shouting of 'Encore'
as well." 798 F.2d at 1475. As Chief Judge Wald observed, there is no distinction made
based on viewpoints in such a statute, unlike section 22-1115. Id. at 1495 n.22 (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting). The dissent then pointed out that section 22-1115 "is equivalent to telling the
audience they may yell encore, but may not boo at the end of a performance that they
dislike." Id. Judge Bork retorted: "If shouting 'Boo,' but not 'Encore,' had the same effect as
shouting 'Fire,' then the law could permissibly regulate the shouting of 'Boo' and 'Fire'
while leaving 'Encore' alone." Id. at 1475. As with section 22-1115, the defect in such a
regulation of speech is that those who hold certain viewpoints are permitted to speak, while
opposing viewpoints are kept from entering the marketplace of ideas. Because such viewpoint discrimination is so hostile to the first amendment, it would be better to require absolute silence than to distort public discussion by silencing those who hold views which are
critical of either a movie or a foreign government. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text.
t Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46. This does not assume that the streets in front
of a foreign embassy are not a nonpublic forum. See id. That the streets around an embassy
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it automatically fails the requirement that the restriction be "content-neutral. '75 However, a statute could be drafted so that the security and dignity interests, if not compelling, are adequately and
constitutionally served without discriminating on the basis of view7
point or content.
CONCLUSION

Finzer marks a significant departure from existing first
amendment doctrine by upholding a statute which quite clearly
discriminates against certain points of view. A viewpoint-discriminatory abridgment of speech distorts public debate by silencing
one point of view while providing an opposed viewpoint with exclusive control of a particular forum. Since this kind of one-sided debate is precisely what the first amendment seeks to prevent, viewpoint-discriminatory statutes must be held unconstitutional,
especially where viable viewpoint-neutral alternatives exist. At the
very least, because viewpoint-based restrictions do more to undermine first amendment values than content-based restrictions, they
should be treated with greater judicial scrutiny.
Anthony J. Colletta

are a public forum seems to be conceded by the Finzer court because, in examining section
22-1115, the court used a strict scrutiny analysis, which is applicable only to public and
limited public forums. Id. See Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1468-69.
75 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46; see also Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-95 (1984) (discussing requirements that time, place, and
manner restrictions must meet to be valid).
71 In protecting foreign emissaries outside the District of Columbia, Congress has fulfilled its obligations to protect the security and dignity of foreign missions through the use
of criminal penalties punishing harassment of foreign officials and through other contentneutral restrictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). In holding this statute constitutional, the
Fifth Circuit relied on its complete content neutrality and on the government's asserted
security interest. CISPES v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 473-75 (5th Cir. 1985).

